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PROPHYLACTIC USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILLEGITIMACY OF
CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN "COALITIONS OF




The author examines the legitimacy of Canada's
participation in acts of non-defensive aggression
in light of Canada's international obligations and
international law. He contends that in the
domestic terrain, constitutional conventions,
practices, and applicable laws as factors that
shape Canada's decisions to participate in
international conflicts, must also be critically
reconsidered.
L'auteur examine le caract~re ligitime de la
participation du Canada dans les actes
d'agression non dtfensifs dans le contexte des
obligations internationalesdu Canada etdu droit
international. II pritend qu'il est aussi tr~s
important de tenir compte du terrain national,
des conventions constitutionnelles, des pratiques
et lois applicables qui sont autant defacteurs qui
faqonnent les dicisions du Canada en ce qui
concerne sa participation aux con flits
internationaux.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Cold War aftermath, with the apparent willingness of states or groups
of states to use force unconstrained by the United Nations Charter' in purported
attempts to remove "threats to international peace,"2 the question has arisen as
LL.B. (Nig.), B.L. (Lagos), LL.M., J.S.D. (Dalhousie), Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful to Clayton Burns for suggesting the
title of this article. This article has been greatly improved by the comments of Professors
Wes Pue and Robin Elliot on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Carol Liao and my former
colleagues, Professors Bill Black and Margot Young for their help in locating relevant
research materials.
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S., 1945, No. 7 [Charter].
2 C.G. Fenwick, "When Is There a Threat to Peace?" (1967) 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 753. The
problem with a juridical application of the concept of "threat to international peace" is that
it is essentially a political concept and if it must be deployed judiciously and judicially, a
multilateral framework or institution is indispensable. In the words of Professor Henkin,
"threat to peace" is not capable of legal definition. It is an imprecise political concept and
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to what Canada's role should be. These non-defensive actions have often been
justified on the grounds of alleged imminent danger to regional stability,3 or the
ostensible need to restore or create democracies,4 or to alleviate alleged
humanitarian crises.5 What is often characteristic about these recent cases of
non-defensive use of force by groups of states is the absence of prior
authorization by the United Nations Security Council.6
Many states or groups of states constituting themselves into arbiters of global
morality, world peace, and democratic values have frequently used or threatened
to use force in imposing their visions of good governance7 and humanitarianism
on an increasingly skeptical and violent world. The overriding purpose of
thus requires a multilateral framework for its articulation. See Louis Henkin,
"Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law" (1997)
36 Alta. L. Rev. 571.
3 Emmanuel Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and The Resolution of Internal
Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia" (1994) 12 Int'l Peacekeeping 1; Margaret
Vogts, ed., Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold.Attempt at Peacekeeping (Lagos:
Gabumo Publishing, 1992); Georg Nolte, "Restoring Peace By Regional Action:
International Law Aspects of The Liberian Conflict" (1993) 53:3 Heidelberg J. Intal L. 663;
Alhaji M.S. Bah, "AACS and Regional Peacekeeping: Unraveling the Political Cleavages"
(2000) 15:3 Intal Insights 61.
4 Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 Am. J.
Intal L. 46; Michael Reisman, "Humanitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies"
(1995) 18 Fordham Intal L.J. 794; Stephen Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment As a Call
To Democracy: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala" (1994) 25 U.
Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 393; Karsten Nowrot & W. Shabacker, "The Use of Force to
Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the AACS Intervention in Sierra
Leone" (1998) 14 Am. U. Intal L. Rev. 321, Malvina Halberstam, "The Copenhagen
Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy" (1993) 34 Harv. Intal L.J. 163.
5 Antonio Cassese, "Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation ofForcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in The World Community?" (1999)
10 E.J.I.L. 23.
6 Rudiger Wolfrum, "The Contributions of Regional Arrangements and Agencies to The
Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Possibilities and Limitations" (1993) 53:3
Heidelberg J. Intal L. 576. A related problem is the increasing inclination of the U.N.
Security Council to franchise out the authorization to states or groups of states. See John
Quigley, "The 'Privatization' of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to
Multilateralism" (1996) 17 Mich. J. Intal L. 249; Richard Falk, "The Haiti Intervention: A
Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations" (1995) 36 Harv. Intal L.J. 341.
7 Oscar Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion" (1984) 78 Am. J. Int'l L. 645;
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, "The Place and Role of Unilateralism in Contemporary International
Law" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 19.
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international law on the use of force, particularly as articulated in the post-U.N.
Charter regime, is to commit states to use force only as a last resort after the
failure or exhaustion of diplomatic and other pacific means of conflict
resolution. 8 Hence, it is a fundamental principle of contemporary legal and
political order that, save the narrow confines of the right to self-defence
(collectively or individually), force may only be used under the authority and
supervision of the Security Council. Given that most of the examples of non-
defensive use of force by states in recent times have been motivated by the
narrow self-interests of powerful states, 9 or groups of states, the emerging
practice of coalitions of states enthusiastic to use force outside the constraints of
the U.N. Charter would condemn established norms on the use of force"0 to
irrelevance." In addition, it is a phenomenon which discomfits the global legal
order, particularly in a "violent world"'12 grappling with new forms of threats to
peace such as international terrorism.
Recently, Iraq has become the focus of an assemblage of states willing and
ready to use force in a purported war on terrorism and in their determination to
disarm that country of its "weapons of mass destruction."' 3 Laudable as this
objective would appear, the newly formed habit of ready embrace of military
force by groups of states or the so-called "coalitions of the willing"'4 acting
S Joel Larus, ed., From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1965).
9 Robert Kagan, "Multilateralism, American Style" Washington Post (13 September 2002)
A39.
'0 Vera Gowlland-Debras, Collective Responses to Illegal Acts in International Law
(Dordrecht: Martinus-Nijhoff, 1990).
H. Freudenschub, "Article 39 of The UN Charter Revisited: Threats to The Peace and The
Recent Practice of The UN Security Council" (1993) 46 Aus. J. Pub. & Intal L. 1.
12 Richard Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968);
Bruno Simma, "NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects" (1999) 10 E.J.I.L. 1;
Mark Weisburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War 2 (Pennsylvania:
1997); Antonio Cassese, ed., The Current Legal Regulation On The Use of Force (Hingham:
Kluwer, 1986).
13 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of The British Government, online:
<www.official-documents.co. uk/document/reps/iraq/iraqdossier.pdf>.
14 President George Bush has repeatedly threatened that if Iraq fails to disarm, the U.S. will
lead a "coalition of the willing" to disarm Saddam Hussein of Iraq. See John King, "Bush:
Join 'Coalition of Willing' CNN Reports (20 November 2002). For an analysis of this issue
see Niels Blokker, "Is the Authorization Authorised? Powers and Practice of the UN
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outside the restraining and deliberative institutions of contemporary global order
probably marks the beginnings of a "demolition of world order"15 as presently
constituted. Agreed that the modem world faces new forms of threats to
international peace, for example, free-lance terrorists operating from failed
states, it is very doubtful whether a destruction of the existing world legal order
without provisions for a replacement is the answer to the threat of free-lance
terrorists and outlaw states. International law is not static, and thus there is little
doubt that the messianic militarism immanent in such seemingly humanitarian
16
or pro-democratic justifications for unilateral use of force by states outside the
confines of the U.N. Charter is not the proper way to address contemporary
global disorder.
In this article, I examine the role which Canada should play in the attempts
by the so-called coalition of the willing to disarm Iraq by force without express
and unambiguous U.N. authorization. I argue that Canada should critically
evaluate both domestic and international procedures regulating non-defensive
use of force in international relations. In shaping my argument, I contend that in
the domestic terrain, constitutional conventions, practices, and applicable laws
as factors that shape Canada's decisions to participate in international conflicts,
must be critically reconsidered. This position is espoused because an important
element in the emerging practice of non-defensive use of force and its
implications for the global order is the domestic political process which shapes
or influences individual state participation in extra-legal use of force.
Consequently, I examine the interrelationship between Canadian democratic
conventions and international law on use of force. Particular attention is paid to
the opinion gaining ground in several quarters that the Security Council is of
doubtful legitimacy and overly politicized by the cynical and expedient interests
of veto-carrying members.
15 Noam Chomsky, "The Demolition of World Order" Harper's Magazine (June 1999) 1517;
B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches
(London: Sage Publications, 1993); Michael Reisman, "Unilateral Action and the
Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian
Intervention" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 3.
16 John Currie, "NATO's Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: Making or Breaking
International Law?" (1999) 37 Can. Y.B. Intal L. 469; S.G. Simon, "The Contemporary
Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention" (1993) 24 Cal. W. Intal L.J. 117; I.
Brownlie, "Thoughts of Kind-Hearted Gunmen" in R.B. Lillich, ed., Humanitarian
Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973) at
139.
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For purposes of clarity and ease of analysis, this article is divided into five
parts. Part 2 briefly reviews and summarizes the Iraqi problem. In Part 3, I
introduce the concept of just war as it applies to Iraq. Part 4 is the central part of
the article and examines the development of Canadian law and political practices
on use of force in international relations. For purposes of convenience, the
analysis in Part 4 is in two themes. The first theme deals with Crown prerogative
in matters of foreign relations and the impact of legislative and judicial
developments on this difficult issue of law. The second theme extends the
arguments beyond the legal doctrine of Crown prerogative and examines the
legitimizing function of parliamentary involvement in decisions pertaining to the
deployment of Canadian personnel to areas of international conflict. In Part 5,
I divide the history of Canadian parliamentary involvement in matters of war
into epochs, namely; the colonial era and Canada's position during the war of
1914-1918, independent Canada and the war of 1939-1945, the Korean conflict
and the U.N. Charter, the first Gulf war of 1991, and finally, the contemporary
efforts by the so-called coalition of the willing against Iraq.
With respect to the pre-U.N. Charter era, I argue that Canada's domestic and
international policy reflected the progressive ideals of those committed to
outlawing war and promoted constraints on the ability of states to use force in
non-defensive circumstances. More importantly, domestic Canadian
parliamentary practices in the pre-U.N. Charter era evinced a cautious approach
to the use of force or participation by Canada in international conflicts. Thus, the
emergence of the United Nations, empowered to secure global peace and
security, could be seen as an affirmation of Canadian skepticism towards
belligerency and recourse to arms in settling conflicts.'
7
Regarding the U.N. Charter era, this watershed in the development of
international law on use of force impacted Canadian domestic normative order
on participation in acts of belligerency. Ultimately, Canada's original fidelity to
the tenets of the U.N. Charter earned it a reputation as an honest broker.
18
However, in the aftermath of Cold War politics, Canada's membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 19 and geographical proximity to and
special relationship with the United States of America, places it in an awkward
position on matters related to use of force. In navigating this treacherous and
17 R. St. MacDonald, "The Relationship Between International and Domestic Law in Canada"
in R. St. MacDonald, Gerald L. Morris & Douglas M. Johnson, eds., Canadian Perspectives
on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
'8 Gibran Van Ert, Using International Law In Canadian Courts (The Hague: Klewer, 2002).
19 North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
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intricate situation, I argue that if Canada's multilateralist traditions and
commitments to the U.N. Charter are to have meaning, parliamentary and public
participation in decisions on when, how, and where Canada participates in non-
defensive armed conflicts are indispensable. Ultimately, Canada has to abide by
principle rather than expediency. However, with a chronically weak opposition
in Parliament and a palpable democratic deficit, it would seem that the
legitimacy of Cabinet decisions in matters such as the Iraqi crisis are open to
question.
II. IRAQ, THE CONCEPT OF JUST WAR, AND COALITIONS OF
THE WILLING
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and purportedly annexed Kuwait.2" The
Security Council met and decided pursuant to Resolutions 66021 and 661 (1990)
of August 1990, that Iraq was in violation of international law. Consequently, it
demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.
Following Iraq's refusal to withdraw, the Security Council passed Resolution
678 (1990) of 29 November 1990,22 authorizing member states to use all
necessary means to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
Iraq refused to comply and was forcefully expelled from Kuwait by an
alliance of states including Canada. As part of the settlement of the Gulf War,
Iraq was required to destroy its programs on weapons of mass destruction made
up of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. After series of United Nations'
supervised efforts to disarm Iraq, it became evident that Iraq had not fully,
accurately, finally and completely disclosed all aspects of its programs to
develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater
than 150 kilometers. Following disagreements between Iraq and U.N. inspectors,
Iraq expelled the United Nations' inspectors in 1998. The weapons inspections
program was to remain in the doldrums for nearly four years.
However, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United
States declared a "war on terror" and in his "State of the Union" address in 2002,
20 Historically, Iraq and Kuwait were originally part of the Ottoman Empire. And prior to the
rise of the Ottoman Empire itself, and "the Arab conquest of the seventh century, Iraq had
been the site of a number of civilizations, including the Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian,
with Baghdad the capital and centre of arts and learning." See L.C. Green, "Iraq, the U.N.
and the Law" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 560.
21 (1990) 29 I.L.M. 1323.
22 S.C. Res. 678, reprinted in (1990) 29 I.L.M. 1565.
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U.S. President George Bush characterized the Iraqi government with Iran and
North Korea as members of what he termed "an axis of evil." Thereafter, the
U.S. pressured the U.N. to ensure that Iraq was made to comply with its
obligations under numerous Security Council resolutions. The United States also
threatened to unilaterally disarm Iraq if it felt that the U.N. was unwilling to do
so. After a series of threats by the United States, on 17 September 2002, Iraq
accepted another round of U.N. inspections.23 Consequently, on 8 November
2002, the Security Council passed another resolution affirming Iraq's obligations
under relevant resolutions and asked Iraq to comply with a stricter inspection
regime, failing which the U.N. would visit it with severe consequences. In the
face of the global divide as to whether states may use force to disarm Iraq if it
failed to disarm voluntarily, the question has arisen as to the legitimacy of the
threats by the so-called "coalition of the willing" and more particularly whether
Canada may legitimately participate in such use of force against Iraq if the
coalition attacks Iraq without explicit U.N. authorization and supervision.
The Iraqi situation presents the problematic question of the U.N.'s role in the
global rule of law24 in an age where immense force is concentrated in one
superpower, the United States. What is remarkable in the contemporary
relationship between powerful and regional bodies and the Security Council is
the disturbing trend in which states or regional groups unilaterally decide, when,
how, and where "threats to global peace" have materialized and upon making
such determinations by themselves, they proceed to impose on themselves the
duty of removing such perceived threats to international peace and security. In
many instances, particularly with respect to Iraq, ambiguous U.N. authorization
has been twisted and submitted to tortuous interpretations to yield unintended
results.25 While some of these crisis situations and the decisions to resort to the
use of force have become subjects of ratification or acquiescence by the Security
Council, it seems obvious that the emerging trend of unilateral use of force by
23 "Russia and China Welcome Iraq Offer," online: <www.cnn.com>; Terence Neilan, "Iraq
Says Move on Inspectors Removes Reasons for Attack" New York Times (17 September
2002) 1; Jeff Sallot & Miro Cernetig, "Iraq Confrontation: Ottawa Greets Baghdad's Offer
Cautiously" Globe & Mail (17 September 2002) Al.
24 Richard Falk, "The United Nations and the Rule of Law" (1994) 4 Transnat'l L. & Contemp.
Probs. 611; Frederic Kirgis, "The Security Council's First Fifty Years" (1995) 89 Am. J.
Intal L. 506.
25 A prime example is the so-called "no-fly" zones in southern and northern Iraq. See Alain
Boileau, "To The Suburbs of Baghdad: Clinton's Extension of the Southern Iraqi No-Fly
Zone" (1997) 3 J. Intal & Comp. L. 875; "France Say U.S. Raid Exceeded UN Resolutions"
San Diego Union Tribune (21 January 1993) Al.
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"coalitions of the willing" poses severe challenges to traditional and recognized
constraints of domestic and international law on the use of force by states.
More importantly, in situations where the motives for such unilateralist
actions are barely camouflaged self-interest, or are at best unclear and
unconvincing to the global community, there is ample reason for a calm
appraisal of the processes of domestic authorization of Canada's participation
in such unilateralist forays. Given that the presumption of international law is
that violence should be avoided unless necessary in given situations, and must
be used sparingly and with proper authorization, a national regime which
potentially gives ample power to the Prime Minister to place Canada in conflicts
must be avoided.
For Canada, significant issues of law, democracy, and policy are raised by
this emerging trend. For example, under what circumstances, if any, may Canada
legitimately deploy troops and equipment to conflicts that have no direct
implication for Canadian peace, security, and territorial integrity? Should Canada
engage in "enforcement actions" which are not authorized by the Security
Council? In the face of skepticism in some quarters that the U.S.-led desire for
a "regime change' 26 in Iraq is not truly motivated by a distaste for tyranny27 or
a profound humanitarian impulse for Iraqis, or to rid Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction, but is instead a desire to "unshackle oil in Iraq' 28 and gain geo-
political advantage in the region, it is necessary to determine whether the
proposed military action by the coalition of the willing is just.
26 "Powell: Regime Change The Best Way to Disarm Iraq" Reuters (25 September 2002),
online: Reuters <reuters.com>. According to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, "regime
change is the best way to ensure that Iraq disarmed."
27 If democracy and good governance were the basis of American relations, several of its close
allies in the Gulf region and elsewhere would fail the test. None of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Egypt, Pakistan or several other "allies" of the U.S. are models of democracy. Most of the
governments in the industrializing world regarded by America as "allies" torture, kill, and
maim political opponents just as Saddam Hussein reputedly does in Iraq. Virtually all the
charges leveled against Iraq would apply with equal force to Pakistan. Yet, there has been
no call for a "regime change" in those countries. Remarkably, U.S. reasons for deposing
President Saddam Hussein have shifted from his alleged links with al-Qaeda to his obsession
with weapons of mass destruction. See Molly Ivins, "Bush Moves Iraq Goalposts All Over
Field" Fort Worth Star Telegram (22 September 2002) 25.
28 Dan Morgan & David Ottaway, "War Could Unshackle Oil in Iraq" Washington Post (15
September 2002) Al. According to this report, "American and foreign oil companies have
already begun maneuvering for a stake in [Iraq]'s huge proven reserves of 112 billion barrels
of crude oil, the largest in the world outside Saudi Arabia." Ibid.
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III. THE CONCEPT OF JUST WAR, COALITION OFTHE WILLING,
AND IRAQ
In his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas postulated that:
[F]or a war to be just three conditions are necessary. First, the authority of the ruler in
whose competence it lies to declare war.. .secondly, there is a required a just cause: that
is those who are attacked for some offence merit such punishment. St. Augustine says,[2 9]
"Those wars are generally defined as just which avenge some wrong, when a nation or
a state is to be punished for having failed to make amends for the wrong done, or to
restore what has been taken unjustly." Thirdly, there is required the right intention on the
part of the belligerents: either of achieving some good object or of avoiding some
evil.. .[However], it can happen that even when war is declared by legitimate authority
and there is just cause, it is, nevertheless, made unjust through evil intention. St.
Augustine says, "the desire to hurt, the cruelty of vendetta, the stern and implacable
spirit, arrogance in victory, the thirst for power, and all that is similar, all these are justly
condemned in war."3
It is noteworthy that the postulations of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine
influenced early international law which ultimately imposed the constraining
structure and processes of contemporary international law on the use of force.3'
In other words, international law on the use of force is deliberately calibrated to
constrain, rather than encourage, the use of force by states. Hence, if the
postulations of Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine are to be used as some form
of guidance in measuring existing obligations regarding use of force by states,
Canada and indeed the world at large would have serious doubts about the
U.S.-led "coalition of the willing. 32
Although the elimination of weapons of mass destruction is an admirable
objective, the hypocrisy behind the project to remove and destroy weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq leaves much to be desired. It is significant that the Iraqi
appetite for weapons of mass destruction was whetted, abetted, and condoned
principally by the U.S. 33 In addition to this appalling policy of hypocrisy, the
29 Contra Fastum, c. 420 A.D., Bk. LXXXIII.
30 Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, trans. by J.G. Dawson (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1948) at 159. Suarez and Bellarmin added as a fourth condition the debitus
modus, that is, the war must be fought with the right means.
31 Jutta Brunnee, "International Law is Meant to Constrain" National Post (23 October 2002)
A22.
32 Julia Preston, "Bush Garners Little Support at U.N. For an Attack on Iraq" New York Times
(17 October 2002) Al.
3 Iraq is known to possess chemical and biological weapons which ironically it obtained with
the help and collusion of institutions and corporations in the United Kingdom, United States,
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U.S. determination to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction is not even-
handed. If justice is about treating like cases alike, it seems unjust that other
states with atrocious human rights records and an appetite for nasty weapons
have not been treated like Iraq. When the U.S. posture on states similar to Iraq
is juxtaposed, the inconsistency becomes indefensible and an insult to common
sense. For example, states such as North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, and India are
known to have sought to acquire or have already acquired and stockpiled
weapons of mass destruction but have not been threatened with unilateral
military action by the "coalition of the willing. '' 34 It would therefore seem that
in relation to the tests of just war, the U.S.-led "coalition of the willing" is, in
the words of Senator Robert Byrd of the U.S. Senate, a "product of presidential
hubris. 35 In effect, the martial disposition of the coalition of the willing is a
display of might rather than the vindication of international law and justice.36
Further, some commentators have wondered why the forceful removal of
President Saddam Hussein is more important now than it was in previous years.
As Nicholas Kristoff has argued, "there is no evidence that invading Iraq is any
more urgent today than it was in, say, 2000.,,37 Allegations that Iraq has links to
Germany, etc. According to a recent report, "between 1985 and 1988, the non-profit
American Type Culture Collection made 11 shipments to Iraq that included a "'witches'
brew of pathogens" including anthrax, botulinum toxin and gangrene. All shipments were
government approved." See Paul Wyden, "Will The US Reap What it Has Sown? Byrd
Asks" West Virginia Gazette (27 September 2002) 4; Robert Novak, "A Little U.S.-Iraqi
History" CNN (9 September 2002). See also, Christopher Dickey & Evan Thomas, "How
the US Helped Create Saddam Hussein" Newsweek (23 September 2002) 7. According to
this report, "the history of America's relations with Saddam is one of the sorrier tales in
American foreign policy.. .It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, America
knowingly permitted the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that
might be used to build biological weapons. But it happened. Through years of tacit and overt
support, the West helped create the Saddam of today, giving him time to build deadly
arsenals and dominate his people. American officials have known that Saddam was a
psychopath ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the early 1970s." Ibid.
3 Maureen Dowd, "Why? Because We Can" New York Times (29 September 2002) 29.
31 Senator Robert Byrd, "Rush To War Ignores U.S. Constitution" Speech on the Floor of
Congress (3 October 2002).
36 Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness" (2002) 113 Policy Rev. 3.
37 Nicholas Kristoff, "The Guns of September" New York Times (14 September 2002) A27;
Dana Priest & Joby Warrick, "Observers: Evidence For War Lacking" Washington Post (13
September 2002) A30. According to Priest and Warrick, "the White House document
released on September 12 contains little new information showing that Hussein is producing
new weapons of mass destruction of has joined with terrorists to threaten the United States
or its interests abroad." In the words of Anthony Cordesman, a Middle East expert who has
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al-Qaeda remain unsubstantiated.38 There have been attempts to explain this on
the grounds of alleged Iraqi links to the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. Yet,
no evidence or proof has been tendered to prove such links. Indeed, the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan was known to have been created and sustained by the
Pakistani government. The Taliban regime sheltered Osama bin-Laden's al-
Qaeda group. Yet Pakistan is an "ally" of U.S. in the war on terrorism. 39 In
addition, there are doubts about whether proponents of unilateral military action
against Iraq have any clear program of action to deal with the aftermath of
removing the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein.' More worrisome is the
perception, fuelled by recent undiplomatic remarks by President Bush, that the
desire for a regime change in Iraq is predicated on personal vendetta. According
to the U.S. President, Saddam Hussein is "the guy that tried to kill my dad.",
4 1
Furthermore, there is a school of thought which believes that recent emphasis
on regime change in Iraq by the Bush Administration is a diversion from the
pressing issues of domestic governance in the United States. Speaking for this
school, Paul Krugman argued in a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times that,
in the end, 19
th century imperialism was a diversion. It is hard not to suspect that the
Bush doctrine is also a diversion-a diversion from the real issues of dysfunctional
security agencies, a sinking economy, a devastated budget and a tattered relationship
with our allies. 2
participated in many major studies of Iraq's capabilities, the White House report was a
"glorified press release that doesn't come close to the information the U.S. government
made available on Soviet military power when we were trying to explain the Cold War."
Ibid. See also Alan Freeman, "Iraq Dossier Gets Cool Reception" Globe & Mail (25
September 2002).
38 Calvin Woodward, "U.S. Sources Hedging on Iraq Facts" Yahoo News (27 September 2002).
The "intelligence report" or dossier given by the British government on Iraqi "weapons of
mass destruction" was recently found to contain plagiarized documents in the public domain.
See Glenn Frankel, "Blair Acknowledges Flaws in Iraqi Dossier: Britain Took Some
Material that Powell Cited at U.N. from 12-year-old Academic Papers" Washington Post (8
February 2003) A15.
39 There are new reports that terrorists group operating in Pakistan have mounted a resurgent
wave of activities. See John Lancaster & Kamran Khan, "Extremist Groups Renew Activity
in Pakistan-Support of Kashmir Militants is at Odds with War on Terrorism" Washington
Post (8 February 2003) Al.
40 Thomas Friedman, "Iraq, Upside Down" New York Times (18 September 2002) A31.
41 Ron Hutcheson, "Saddam Tried To Kill My Dad, Bush Tells Texans" Salt Lake Tribune (28
September 2002) 1.
42 Paul Krugman, "White Man's Burden" New York Times (24 September 2002) A27.
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Finally, on this point, there are considerable scholarly doubts regarding the
legality of claims to a "forcible enforcement of the inspection regime. 43 This is
largely because the original Security Council Resolution, 1154, regarding the
weapons inspection regime did not authorize unilateral use of force. Indeed, later
resolutions on the same subject matter did not provide for the use of force to
compel disarmament. Moreover, scholarly opinion on the legality of implied
authorizations of the use of force is opposed to the idea that ambiguous Security
Council resolutions should be construed liberally to justify unilateral use of
force. A fundamental objective of the U.N. Charter is to "save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war,"" so resolutions of the U.N. should be read
in a manner consistent with this objective. In sum, any unilateral use of force
against Iraq by the "coalition of the willing" will fail the tests for just war.45
IV. CROWN PREROGATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CANADA'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
Originally, the position of the common law was that the royal prerogative was
immune from judicial review.46 In Canada, the right to declare war is a
prerogative of the Crown.47 Dicey describes prerogative as the "residue of
discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is left in the hands
of the crown. 48 The term "Crown" in the juridical sense refers in a collective
sense to all the persons and institutions of the state who lawfully act in the name
of the Queen. In other words, the word "Crown" is synonymous with the less
grandiose term "government." However, judicial deference to Crown prerogative
has yielded to a regime of measured judicial review.49 Hence, in modem times,
the prerogative of the Crown is not a boundless power. As Professor Hogg has
pointed out, "the prerogative of the Crown is a branch of the common law,
because it is the decisions of the courts which have determined its existence and
extent.
50
41 Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, infra note 142.
4 Charter, supra note 1, Preamble.
4' David Stout, "Kennedy Urges Restraint in Confrontation With Iraq" New York Times (27
September 2002).
46 China Navigation Co. v. Attorney-General, [19321 2 K.B. 197 (C.A.).
47 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law (Concord: Irwin Law, 1997) at 62.
48 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1965) at 424.
49 Chandler v. D.P.P. (1962), [1964) A.C. 763 at 810 (H.L.), Devlin L.J. [Chandler].
'0 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997) at 12-14.
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Although the scope and extent of the Crown prerogative has been somewhat
limited by the courts 5' and by some statutory provisions,52 there seems to be an
unresolved question as to whether the Crown's prerogative to declare war and
make peace on behalf of the state is in modem times subject to judicial review.
In the celebrated GCHQ case,53 the House of Lords, per Roskill L.J., placed the
"defence of the realm" among those categories which "at present advised I do
not think could properly be made the subject of judicial review." 54 Clearly, in
England the law is settled that matters of foreign policy including decisions by
the Crown on participation in acts of belligerency are not justiciable.55 Indeed,
the British government is not even legally obliged to give reasons for its
decisions on such matters that pertain to foreign policy 6 and the courts in
England do not have the authority to rule on the true meaning and effects of
obligations applying only at the level of international law.57
It would seem that the position in Canada is somewhat unclear. 58 Legislative
developments such as the National Defence Act59 and the War Measures Act
(when it was still in effect), 60 which encroach on Crown prerogative in matters
regarding defence of the realm, have potentially extended the reach of judicial
review.6' It is now settled law in Canada that where an exercise of Crown
51 Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 [Operation Dismantle].
52 For example, under s. 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,
Cabinet decisions are reviewable. See Gerald La Forest, "The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: An Overview" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 19.
53 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.)
[GCHQ].
14 Ibid. at 418.
55 R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett, [ 1989]
Q.B. 811 (C.A.); Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002]
E.W.C.A. Civ. 1598.
56 Stefan v. General Medical Council, [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1293 (P.C.).
7 R. v. Lyons, [2002] H.L.J. 44 (QL).
58 Gibran Van Ert, supra note 18 at 93.
59 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-4.
60 The War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-2. For a judicial interpretation of the act see R.
v. Gray, [1918] 57 S.C.R. 150. The act was in effect until 1988 when it was repealed by the
Emergencies Act, S.C. 1988, c. 29 [Emergencies Act]. See Hogg, supra note 50 at 17-22.
61 As Professor Monahan observes, "the courts have held that where a prerogative power has
been regulated or defined by statute, the statute in effect displaces the prerogative and the
Crown must act on the basis of the statutorily defined power." Monahan, supra note 47 at
63. See A.G. v. De Keyser's Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.). Monahan, ibid. Given that
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prerogative breaches written laws, the courts will not shirk from the duty of
reviewing the Crown prerogative in issue. Canadian courts in Air Canada v.
British Columbia,62 Schmidt v. The Queen,63 United States of America v.
Cotroni,64 and United States of America v. Burns, 65 have displayed an
unmistakable willingness to subject Crown prerogative to judicial review,
particularly where rights protected by written laws are alleged to have been
violated by the exercise of Crown prerogative.
However, none of the cases mentioned above deals squarely with the
justiciability66 of executive decisions on Canadian participation in use of force
in international relations. To the best of my knowledge, the only case which may
be of some relevance is the Supreme Court decision in Operation Dismantle v.
The Queen.67 The appellants alleged that the decision of the federal Cabinet to
allow the United States to test cruise missiles in Canadian airspace violated their
rights as enshrined ins. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.68 The majority
of the Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the alleged increased threat
of nuclear war supposedly inherent in the tests was predicated on speculative
hypothesis. However, the Court was clear that foreign policy decisions of the
government made by the Cabinet arejusticiable where such decisions are alleged
to infringe the rights of Canadians or persons resident in Canada.
The reasoning of the Court is somewhat difficult to follow. The plurality of
the Court indicated that judicial restraint from review of such decisions is
premised on the theory that proof of facts in support of justiciability of such
claims would be almost impossible. In the words of the majority of the Court:
[S]ince the foreign policy decisions of independent and sovereign nations are not capable
of prediction, on the basis of evidence, to any degree of certainty approaching
probability, the nature of such reactions can only be a matter of speculation; the causal
the provisions of the Emergencies Act relate to issues of domestic integrity, security and
territorial integrity of Canada, I will avoid further analysis of this legislation and its possible
implications for the subject under analysis.
62 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539.
63 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
64 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
65 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
66 In the United States, the issue of justiciability of "political" questions is often vexed. See
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
67 Operation Dismantle, supra note 51.
61 Ibid.
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link between the decision of the Canadian government to permit the testing of the cruise
[missiles] and the results that the appellants allege could never be proven.
69
These comments reflect the view of Lord Radcliffe in Chandler v. D.P.P.7°
regarding the ability of the courts to review the complex host of factors which
come into play when a parliamentary cabinet decides on participation in
international conflicts. However, Wilson J. anchored her decision on the
propriety of judicial review rather than the fictional inability of the courts to
review such Cabinet decisions. In her words:
[I]f we are to look at the Constitution for the answer to the question whether it is
appropriate for the courts to "second guess" the executive on matters of defence, we
would conclude that it is not appropriate. However, if what we are being asked to do is
to decide whether any particular act of the executive violates the rights of the citizens,
then it is not only appropriate that we answer the question; it is our obligation under the
Charter to do so."
It would therefore seem that a Cabinet decision placing Canada in a state of
international conflict is not justiciable per se, but may be judicially scrutinized
where there is evidence to support the claim that the Cabinet decision has
infringed the rights of Canadians in circumstances that are not demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society. In sum, the Crown prerogative on
matters of war remains intact, albeit with some modicum of judicial inroads.
Be that as it may, assuming there is no explicit authority in support ofjudicial
review of Crown's prerogative to place Canada in active belligerency or to
engage in enforcement actions authorized by the U.N., Crown prerogative in
such matters is politically constrained by parliamentary practices and democratic
norms. Although these practices do not have thejuridical character of customary
law as their equivalents in international law, they embody accepted codes of
conduct impacting on the legitimacy of such decisions. Consequently, Crown
prerogative, at least in the political sphere, is not a blank cheque. Theoretically,
democracy and parliamentary practices are designed to curb executive rascality
and impetuosity, particularly in matters as grave as the use of force in
international relations.
The absence of explicit constitutional constraints on the Crown prerogative
to declare war is derived from Canada's constitutional heritage (inherited from
6' Ibid. at 452.
70 Chandler, supra note 49.
71 Operation Dismantle, supra note 51 at 472.
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British constitutional conventions) whereby "political leaders could be trusted
to exercise power in a restrained and responsible fashion. 72 The reverse could
be said to be the case in the U.S. where laws are designed to curb executive
propensity for war.73 In the U.S., it is arguable that the separation of powers is
stricter and thus the courts are institutionally leery of second-guessing the
competence of Congress to declare war and make peace.74
The trusting relationship in Canada is probably reciprocal and is ostensibly
founded on the Kantian notion that a parliamentary regime with the restraints of
democratic and responsible governance would be less likely to use force in
international relations unless there are clear, justifiable and compelling
circumstances to warrant such momentous decisions. The theory is that only an
irresponsible government would disregard informed public opinion or
parliamentary participation when formulating decisions regarding deployment
of Canadians to war. If such a government were to be so reckless, there would
probably be a heavy political price to pay for such folly.
However, with mounting evidence of increased power in the hands of the
Canadian Prime Minister75 vis-at-vis an impotent and fractious opposition in the
Canadian political system, it is doubtful whether Canada's imprudent trust in
executive good faith on such an extraordinary matter as the use of force in
international relations is not unduly naive and long overdue for a rethink.
Although the decision to use force in international relations may in some
circumstances become a potential subject of judicial review, the importance of
72 Monahan, supra note 47 at 17.
" Louis Henkin, "Is There a 'Political Question' Doctrine?" (1976) 85 Yale L.J. 597.
14 Martin Redish, "Abstention, Separation of Powers, and The Limits of the Judicial Function"
(1984) 94 Yale L.J. 71; Fritz Scharpf, "Judicial Review and The Political Question: A
Functional Analysis" (1966) 75 Yale L.J. 517; Melville Weston, "Political Questions"
(1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296. The issue ofjusticiability of the so-called "political questions"
other than war has met with mixed results in the United States. See e.g. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). The presence of clear constitutional restraints on executive forays into
belligerency has not necessarily stopped the government of the United States from
participating in wars without express Congressional declaration of war. America last
declared war in the Second World War but has since engaged in conflicts as in Vietnam.
7 Some commentators have made legitimate observations to the effect that Canada is
witnessing an increase of power in the hands of the Prime Minister and a "decay of
Parliament." See Wes Pue, "The Chretien Legacy" Parkland Post (4 December 2001) 1. At
a recent public function at the University of British Columbia, the Member of Parliament
for Vancouver-Quadra, Stephen Owen, argued that caucus discussions are open, animated,
and effective.
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popular participation in parliamentary debates on issues of when, how, and
where Canada uses force in international relations seems to be in the realm of
political legitimacy rather than juridical validity. Needless to say, to ensure that
Canada is not needlessly plunged into conflicts, a crucial factor is a vibrant,
responsive, and alert Parliament. It therefore follows that in examining the
probative value to be attached to the processes which yield Canada's decisions
to play a role in international conflicts, regard must be had to certain factors
including the quality of the debate in Parliament, the power of the caucus, the
potency of the opposition parties, and the extent to which members of the public
appreciate the nature of sacrifices which belligerency inevitably imposes on the
state. It is now apposite to evaluate the normative significance of Canadian
parliamentary practices regarding the use of force in international relations since
1914 to the present date.
V. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, CANADIAN POLITICAL
PRACTICES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL LEGAL AND
SECURITY ORDER
A. Canada and the War of 1914-1918
In 1914, Canada was a colony of the United Kingdom. This historical factor
heavily influenced the political legitimacy of the circumstances in which Canada
participated in that war.76 It is therefore not surprising that the political processes
preceding Canadian participation in the war of 1914-1918 seemed to be a poor
rehash of parliamentary developments and events in the U.K. Accordingly, like
other British colonies, Canada joined the war on 4 August 1914, the same day
as the U.K. It is significant that the colonial government in Canada took certain
steps to legitimize, at least in the court of public opinion, Canada's participation
in that war.
First, on 4 August 1914, the Canadian government "issued an order in council
indicating that Canada was at war with Germany."'77 What is interesting here is
that although Parliament was not sitting at the time when war broke out between
Great Britain and Germany, Parliament was reconvened on 18 August 1914. It
was on that day that after hearing the Governor General's speech in the Senate,
the Canadian government issued an order-in-council proclaiming that Canada
76 Michel Rossignol, "International Conflicts: Parliament, The National Defence Act, and the
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was at war and created war-related measures."8 Second, the decision to go to war
was debated in Parliament and in a normative sense, it is correct to say that there
was popular input to the government's ultimate decision to join the conflict on
the side of Great Britain. It would therefore seem that these measures conferred
legitimacy on Canada's participation in the war of 1914-1918.
Shortly after the war of 1914-1918, there was a heightened global movement
towards arbitration of disputes and possibly the outlawing of war.79 Greater
emphasis was placed on the former, and thus a decision as to whether to engage
in war was to be predicated on a failure of honest and serious attempts at pacific
settlement of disputes. This understanding was reflected in the Pact of the
League of Nations. The significant aspect of the normative thrust of the League
of Nations was that war was forbidden if the conflict had not been first submitted
to arbitral jurisdiction and judicial settlement or to the examination of the
Council created by the League.8° On the whole, it may be argued that the "legal
principles of the League of Nations were extended in the direction of outlawing
war."' 81 It is equally interesting that the United States of America was one of the
greatest proponents of constraining the legal abilities of states to wage war,
particularly wars of aggression.82 Thus, the Protocol of Geneva of 1923 and the
Pact of Locarno represented attempts by some states during this era to constrain
states from resorting to war. These agreements did not, however, prevent the
Graeco-Bulgarian conflict but they influenced the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27
August 1928, which outlawed all aggressive wars.83
Canada was a signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In addition to the
juridical milestone created by the Pact, its moral import was no less significant.
It criminalized states which engaged in aggressive warfare and disallowed war
as a means of national policy. Implicit in this normative shift is that war is
78 House of Commons, Debates (19 August 1914).
79 For an account of this epochal development in international law, see Hans Wehberg, The
Outlawry of War (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1951).
so Article 12(1), League of Nations, 225 Can. T.S. 188 (1919); Wehberg, ibid. at 9.
8' Wehberg, ibid. at 14.
82 The high noon of U.S. efforts in this regard is undoubtedly the Kellogg-Briand Pact for
world peace. This pact arose from the exchange of notes between United States Secretary
of State Kellogg and his French counterpart Monsieur Briand. See (1928) 22 Am. J. Intal L.
356.
83 See also Peter Karsten & Richard Nunt, eds., Unilateral Force in International Relations
(New York: Garland, 1972); Christine Chinkin, "The State That Acts Alone: Bully, Good
Samaritan or Iconoclast" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 31; Allan Gerson, "Multilateralism A la Carte:
The Consequences of 'Pick and Pay' Approaches" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 61.
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permissible if undertaken as part of an international sanction against a
recalcitrant state. However, the decision as to whether or not a war of sanction
was necessary was solely within the competence of the international community.
Given the presumptions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact against war, such decisions
were to be undertaken with the greatest solemnity and due process both at the
domestic and international levels.84
B. Canada and the War of 1939-1945
It was under the legal climate detailed above that Canada and the rest of the
world faced the challenges of the Second World War.8 5 By 1939, when the
Second World War broke out, Canada was an independent state. However,
formal political independence from Great Britain hardly severed or diminished
existing economic, cultural and diplomatic ties between Great Britain and
Canada. It was therefore natural that Canada would have strong sympathies with
Great Britain when the latter declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939
after Germany had invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. It is hardly debatable
that Canada's preference to join the war a few days after Great Britain was
calculated to create the impression that Canada was an independent political
entity and no longer tied to Great Britain.86 Consequently, Canada allowed ten
days to elapse before jumping into the fray.
What is significant for the purposes of my analysis in this article is the
domestic political process which culminated in the exercise of Crown
prerogative to declare war on Germany. A few facts are crucial in my analysis.
First, when the war started in Europe, Parliament was not in session. Indeed,
Parliament was not scheduled to resume before 2 October 1939, but owing to the
emergency, Parliament was summoned on 7 September 1939. Great Britain had
already been at war with Germany since 3 September 1939. After the Governor
General read the Speech from the Throne, parliamentary debates on the war were
held from 8-10 September 1939.87 Both chambers of Parliament debated and
approved the motion for a formal declaration of war on Germany. 88 What is very
significant here is that parliamentary debate preceded the order-in-council
" Luigi Sturzo, The International Community and the Right of War (New York: Furtig, 1970).
15 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).
86 J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics ofthe Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975) [Canada's War].
7 House of Commons, Debates (9 September 1939).
88 House of Commons, Debates (11 September 1939).
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declaring war. This procedure was also followed when war was declared on Italy
in 1940.89 It is thus correct to assert that from 1939 to 1940, Canada followed a
pattern of debate in Parliament before using force in its international relations.
However, this pattern of parliamentary debate prior to Canadian engagement
in armed conflicts was broken in the course of a subsequent increase of
belligerent states in that conflict and Canada's use of force against Japan,
Hungary, Romania, and Finland - countries which had aligned with Germany
in the Second World War. With particular reference to Japan, Parliament had
been adjourned since 14 November 1941 and was not scheduled to resume
sitting until 21 January 1942. In the interval, on 7 December 1941, Japan
bombed Pearl Harbour. Although there was a special sitting of the two chambers,
it was not for the purposes of debating any war resolution on Japan but to hear
an "address to the Canadian Parliament by the British Prime Minister, Winston
Churchill." 9 Parliament resumed sitting on the date scheduled, 21 January 1942,
and discussed a proclamation of war on Japan dated 8 December 1941. The
proclamation purported that Canada had been at war with Japan as of 7
December 1941. For the first time in Canadian constitutional history, the country
was engaged in conflict without prior parliamentary debate and approval. 91
Similar proclamations which had been back-dated to 7 December 1941 were
made with respect to Hungary, Romania and Finland, who all had joined the axis
coalition. This untidy procedure was justified by Prime Minister Mackenzie
King with the argument that belligerency with Hungary, Romania, and Finland
were "all part of the same war., 92 Remarkably, records of parliamentary debates
on this issue support the position of the Prime Minister as none of the opposition
parties questioned the normative import of the precedent set by Prime Minister
Mackenzie King. Given that there were subsequent ratifications of the
declarations of war against Germany's allies, there is little doubt that the
declarations of war on these allies of Japan and Germany would have been
quickly approved if they had been tabled before Parliament prior to the actual
engagement of hostilities.
As Rossignol observes, "Canadian public opinion accepted that Canada had
no choice but to maintain its war effort against the continued aggression of
89 House of Commons, Debates (10 June 1940).
90 Rossignol, supra note 76 at 5.
"l House of Commons, Debates (21 January 1942).
92 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: 1921-1948, v. 2 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1981) at 320.
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Germany, Japan, and Italy and their allies." 93 Even the pacifist Cooperative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party which had maintained its opposition to
Canadian participation in the war yielded ground on this issue. Speaking for the
CCF party in Parliament on 10 June 1940, M.J. Coldwell observed that "this war
is none of our seeking; it is thrust upon us. And we have no option it seems to
me, but to accept the challenge and to go forward to ultimate victory. 94
However, some Canadians, particularly Professor Frank Scott, were appalled at
the government's politics in respect of prior parliamentary debate and approval
of Canada's use of force in international relations. In a letter to Prime Minister
Mackenzie King in 1939, Scott complained that "a group of individuals took so
many steps to place Canada in a state of active belligerency before Parliament
met ... you very greatly limited Canadian freedom of action to decide what
course to follow.
95
In reply to Scott's quarrels with the politics of Canadian participation in some
aspects of the war without prior parliamentary approval, some commentators like
Michel Rossignol have argued that Scott probably misread Canadian public
opinion on the issue. According to Rossignol,
While Professor Scott thought that Parliament had been ignored, other Canadians would
have been angered by any government delay in rallying to Britain's side as soon as war
broke out. In other words, there were opposing views on the importance of Parliament's
role in the process. The government, by insisting on reconvening Parliament before
actually declaring war, had asserted Parliament's importance in the political process, and
this was generally accepted by Canadians.96
It seems that Rossignol has misconceived the kernel of Scott's argument. Scott's
grouse is with the procedure rather than presumptions about whether the public
would have ultimately approved Canada's use of force. In any event, the
Canadian public owe no gratitude to the government for tabling such weighty
issues for parliamentary discussion. The decision to use force in international
relations is the most important decision and given that it is the public that bears
the financial and emotional costs of such decisions, the government is obliged
to engage with public input. Second, although the Canadian government, acting
under extreme emergency, may place Canada in an active state of belligerency
without prior parliamentary approval, there is doubt whether Canada's wars
against Finland, Japan, Romania, and Hungary fell into this category. If
13 Rossignol, supra note 76 at 6.
9' House of Commons, Debates (10 June 1940) at 653.
9' Canada's War, supra note 86 at 10.
96 Rossignol, supra note 76 at 7.
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Parliament had the time and patience to sit down and listen to Prime Minister
Churchill, what stopped it from engaging in the more important task of debating
Canada's proposed wars against Finland, Romania, and Hungary? More
importantly, Rossignol's arguments seem to ignore the symbolic value of
parliamentary participation in such momentous decisions as the use of force by
the state. Even if the outcome of such parliamentary process is a foregone
conclusion, due process and legitimate governance require fidelity to such
conventions.
Apart from public participation in the deliberations on use of force by Canada
in its foreign relations, the significant aspect of an insistence on conventions and
symbolic deliberation is that it validates the undoubted centrality of Parliament
in the political-cum-legal process whereby Canada uses force in its international
relations. However, this obligation must be balanced with the need to maintain
executive flexibility in times of great emergency. The Cabinet can make certain
decisions, especially those of a military nature where speed and security are
factors, before consulting Parliament. Surely, it cannot be argued that Canadian
troops in the trenches of Europe, shot at by enemy troops, should not act in self-
defence merely because Parliament in Ottawa had not yet debated and approved
an extension of the conflict to those new enemy states.
C. The U.N. Charter, Canada and the Korean Crisis
The end of the Second World War ushered in a new era of international
norms, particularly on the threat or use of force in international relations. Only
two exceptions were created by the Charter of the United Nations permitting the
use of force by states, namely, actions in self-defence and enforcement actions
authorized by the Security Council. Canada is a member of the United Nations
and a signatory to the Charter and is therefore bound by the provisions of it. On
self-defence, article 51 of the Charter97 provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security. 98
97 Charter, supra note I at art. 5 1.
98 Ibid.
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Article 51 thus preserves the rights of states under customary international
law to act in self-defence whether individually or collectively." Although there
are two parallel regimes on self-defence, the U.N. Charter has the fundamental
objective of substituting state unilateral actions with a deliberative international
machinery. In effect, article 51 provisions must be read within the context of the
Charter's objective to curtail the relatively liberal regime of self-defence under
customary international law. This argument is supported by the fact that having
regard to the prevailing circumstances under which the Charter was negotiated,
drawn, and agreed to by member states and its raison d'etre, there is a
discernible disposition against the use of force by states in their dealings with
one another. Indeed, article 2(4) of the Charter expressly reinforces this
teleological disposition.1°°
Furthermore, articles 25 and 28 of the Charter confirm this view as both
provisions seek to confer a monopoly of the use of force in international law on
the Security Council. In other words, the object of the Charter is to constrain
states in their ability to have recourse to force in the resolution of disputes.''
International law does not recognize anticipatory self-defence, or the doctrine of
"first strike"'' 0 2 recently propounded by President George Bush. The Security
Council has never authorized use of force on potential or non-imminent threats
of violence. In fact, the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg
emphatically rejected Germany's argument that they were compelled to attack
Norway in order to prevent an Allied invasion. Defensive use of force is
therefore only permissible on the occurrence of an armed attack.0 3
9 C.M.H. Waldock, "The Regulation Of The Use Of Force By Individual States In
International Law," in General Course On Public International Law (1952) 166:2 Hague
Recueil des Cours 451 at 451; The Nicaragua Case, [1986] I.C.J.R. 14.
'00 W.C. Greig, "Self Defense and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?"
(1991) 40 I.C.L.Q. 366.
'0' Phillip Jessup, A Modern Law Of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1948) at 166; Ruth
Wedgwood, "Unilateral Action in the UN System" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 349.
'02 "The National Security Strategy of the United States" (20 September 2002). This document
is to be sent to the U.S. Congress as a declaration of the Administration's policy. See David
Sanger, "Bush Outlines Doctrine of Striking Foes First" New York Times (20 September
2002) Al.
103 Article 3, paragraph (g) of the "Definition of Aggression" annexed to General Assembly
Resolution 3314 XXIX defines "armed attack" as, in addition to sending regular forces
across an international border, "[T]he sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands,
groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state
of such gravity as to amount to" armed attack if carried out by regular forces.
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The second category of permissible use of force in resolving international
disputes is enforcement actions authorized by the Security Council. Although the
Security Council, for unjustifiable reasons, failed to act or was tardy in
responding to crises in Rwanda,'0 4 Zaire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kosovo,
10 5
there is no doubt that it is the only international organ vested with the
responsibility of determining the existence of threats to international peace and
removing them through the mechanism of chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. This
juridical and political fact derives from the principle of taking "effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."'
0 6
Although the phrase "threat to international peace" is not defined in the
Charter, the only organ in the world capable of making that determination as
provided in chapter 5 of the U.N. Charter is the Security Council. As provided
in article 39 of the Charter: "[T]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security."' 7
The Charter also makes provisions for the mechanism by which such crucial
functions may be exercised. While article 7 of the Charter establishes the
Security Council, articles 23 and 24 state the responsibility of the Council.
Article 24 provides that the members of the United Nations "confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." The power to maintain
international peace is not to be exercised capriciously. Article 24(2) thus
provides that "in discharging those duties the Security Council shall act in
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."'08 To
reinforce the supremacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of
international peace, the determination of what constitutes a threat to international
peace and security is the sole responsibility of the Council. In removing threats
'o4 Peter Rosenblum, "Irrational Exuberance: The Clinton Administration In Africa" (2002)
101:655, Current History 195 at 201.
'0S Assessment of the Special Representative of the SG, Report SG UN Doc. S/25402 (12
March 1993).
'06 Ibid. See also Vera Gowlland-Debas, "The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community
Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 361.
107 Charter, supra note 1 at art. 39 [emphasis added].
108 Ibid. at art. 24(1).
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to international peace by enforcement actions, the Security Council may utilize
the services of regional organizations. As provided in article 53, "[tlhe Security
Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies
for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council."' 10 9 From the foregoing, it is clear that no
enforcement action may be taken by any organization or state without the
authority of the Security Council. To assess the legitimacy of Canada's
participation in "enforcement actions," two levels of analysis are required. The
first is to determine whether the enforcement action in question has been
authorized by the Security Council and the second is whether the domestic
processes leading to Canadian participation in such enforcement actions are
legitimate. In determining the first, it is imperative to define enforcement
actions. "o
The editors of the European Commentary on the Charter of the United
Nations have argued that by virtue of the travauxpreparatoires of the Charter,
all measures under chapter 8 of the Charter, without exception, are enforcement
measures. A different school of thought defines enforcement actions as the use
of military force and mandatory sanctions excluding purely defensive actions. "'
It would seem that enforcement actions relate to those actions (excluding
defensive acts) which ultimately require military coercion or force for their
effect. "2
Further, in examining the legitimacy of Canada's participation in
enforcement actions after the entry into effect of the U.N. Charter, it has to be
borne in mind that the long ideological struggle between the defunct "Soviet
Union and the United States [and their respective allies] defined much of each
'09 Charter, supra note 1 at art. 53 [emphasis added].
110 Bruno Simma, et al., eds., The Charter Of The United Nations: A Commentary (London:
Oxford University Press, 1994) at 565.
. Michael Akehurst, "Enforcement Action By Regional Agencies With Special Reference To
The Organization of American States" (1967) 7 Brit. Y.B. Intal L. 175.
1 In 1960, there was an unsuccessful attempt by President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic
to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela. The member states of the OAS acting
under arts. 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty agreed to impose sanctions on the Dominican Republic
and a break of diplomatic relations with it. At the Security Council, the Soviet Delegate
argued that the OAS action amounted to an enforcement action requiring the prior
authorization of the Security Council. UN Doc.s/4491 (9 September 1960). Compare with
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nation's view of the legality of threatening or using military force in international
relations."' 3 In the wake of the end of the Cold War, it follows that
interpretations of legitimate use of force would contain less ideological rhetoric
than before. Another factor which has an impact on the legitimacy of Canada's
participation in enforcement actions is her membership in certain military
organizations, such as NATO. The cumulative impact of these momentous.
factors is that Canada's reputation as an honest broker is often strained. An
evaluation of Canada's role in the Korean Crisis and the Gulf War helps to
understand the difficulty Canada often faces in walking the tight-rope.
On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Due to the propitious
absence of the Soviet representative on the Security Council, the Council passed
a resolution authorizing member states of the U.N. to assist South Korea in
dealing with North Korean aggression and to restore peace on the Korean
peninsula. The Security Council resolution was brought to the attention of
Parliament by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson. In
the course of parliamentary debates on the nature of Canada's participation in the
Korean conflict, Prime Minister St. Laurent strongly argued that
any participation by Canada in carrying out [the Security Council Resolution]-and I
wish to emphasize this strongly-would not be participation in war against any state. It
would be our part in collective police action under the control and authority of the
United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace to the area where an aggression has
occurred as determined under the Charter of the United Nations by the Security Council,
which decision has been accepted by us."4
From the foregoing, it is clear that both the Prime Minister and Parliament were
clear that if Canada were to participate in the operation in the Korean peninsula,
it was doing so as part of the collective police action under the auspices of the
Security Council rather than as a belligerent act orchestrated by a group of states
acting outside the authority of the Security Council. More importantly, there was
a definite commitment on the part of the Prime Minister to submit the question
of Canada's participation in the enforcement action to parliamentary debate.
According to Prime Minister St. Laurent, "If the situation in Korea or elsewhere,
after prorogation [of Parliament], should deteriorate and action by Canada
beyond that which I have indicated should be considered, Parliament will
113 Rein Mullerson & David Scheffer, "Legal Regulation of The Use of Force," in L. Damrosch,
G. Danilenko & R. Mullerson, eds., Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-
Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) at 93.
"4 House of Commons, Debates (30 June 1950) at 4459 [emphasis added].
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immediately be summoned to give the new situation consideration."'' 15 Although
Parliament did not "pass a motion specifically dealing with Canadian
participation in U.N. police action in Korea,""16 the desirability of Canadian
participation in the enforcement action was raised in Parliament on 26 and 30
June 1950, and on 29 August 1950. Clearly, notwithstanding the added layer of
the U.N. regime to the law on use of force by states, the Canadian political
process made room for debate on whether Canada ought to participate in the
Korean conflict. It is equally arguable, as already pointed out by Rossignol, that
by passing the Defence Appropriation ActI1 (which was tied to the expenses in
the Korean conflict), Parliament impliedly authorized Canada's participation in
U.N. enforcement action against North Korea. "8 Although the legality of U.N.
action in Korea or the U.N. condonation of the action is a matter of debate in
some circles," 9 it is arguable that the Korean conflict established the principle
that Canada can be involved in a collective police action against a state as
authorized by the U.N. without such military action being construed as unlawful.
As already noted, two major contributions by the U.N. Charter to the
jurisprudence of international law on the threat or use of force are (1) the
collective use of force to deal with threats to peace and aggression, and (2) the
renunciation of the use of force by governments and its replacement with the
peaceful resolution of disputes.120 These two tenets require that states accept the
limits imposed by law, even when their instincts and self-interests suggest
otherwise.' 2' These principles further elevate multilateralism to an end in itself,
not a mere tactic to be used or dumped at the whim of national interests. 22 It
would amount to a restatement of the obvious to say that the Canadian attitude
to the threat or the use of force has been heavily influenced by these two pillars
of international law. Through a tradition of domestic debate prior to or
immediately after the use of force, Canada has deferred to the authority of the
"5 Ibid.
116 Rossignol, supra note 76 at 8.
117 Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, S.C. 1950-51, c. 5.
18 House of Commons, Debates (8 September 1950) at 495.
'19 According to some scholars such as Hans Arnold, the activities in Korea were not a U.N.
war but a war of Western states condoned by the UN. See Hans Arnold, "The Gulf Crisis
and The United Nations" (1991) 42 Aussenpolitik 68.
120 Advisory Opinion, "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons" (1996) I.C.J.R. 1.
121 But see Madeleine Albright, "The United States and the United Nations: Confrontation or
Consensus?" (1995) 61 Vital Speeches of the Day 354, arguing that multilateralism is a
means, not an end.
122 Lobel & Ratner, infra note 142.
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Security Council as the ultimate supervisor and executor in matters related to
non-defensive use or threat of use of force in international relations.
123
However, certain circumstances and developments such as Cold War politics,
Canadian proximity to the U.S., plus Canadian membership in NATO often
combine to stretch Canadian reluctance to act only within the strict letters of the
U.N. Charter on matters regarding unilateral or non-defensive use of force.124 It
can hardly be doubted that Canada's other obligations to members of NATO
have impacted and will continue to impact on Canadian responses to military
threats or the temptation to use force outside the regime of the United Nations. 1
25
Regardless of the seductions of power, Canada should refuse to participate in any
non-defensive military operation by NATO or the so-called coalition of the
willing where such military operations are unauthorized by the Security Council.
D. The Gulf War, Canada, and the Legitimacy of the Security
Council
For many decades, the Korean conflict remained the solitary instance wherein
the U.N. authorized or at least condoned a collective police action against a
belligerent state. Therefore, when on 2 August 1990, Iraqi tanks rolled into
Kuwait and Iraq purportedly annexed it, there was global apprehension that Iraq
had put the U.N. machinery to a severe test. As indicated in the preceding pages,
the U.N. responded by asking Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Following Iraq's
refusal to withdraw, sanctions were imposed and the Security Council ultimately
authorized member-states to assist Kuwait in repulsing the Iraqi aggression. The
sanctions imposed on Iraq required military forces for their implementation and
Canada, a leading proponent of support for enforcement actions, did not have
any problems with the resolutions on Iraq.
Given that the enforcement action to remove Iraq from Kuwait (and no more)
was sanctioned by the U.N., there was no need for a declaration of war against
123 As Rossignol has argued, "Canada has always strongly supported the United Nations and
championed collective action to ensure international peace." Rossignol, supra note 76 at 13.
124 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping:
Implications for Canada, Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Seventh Report (April 2000).
125 There is no problem under the U.N. Charter with NATO members undertaking non-Article
5 operations in respect of self-defence. There is a problem when NATO engages in military
operations of a non-defensive character. Only the U.N. Security Council has the authority
to permit such actions.
Vol. 8, No. 2
Review of Constitutional Studies
Ikechi Mgbeoji 197
Iraq. But there was need for a parliamentary debate of the issues. In addition, it
was within the powers of the Governor-in-Council, without recalling Parliament,
to authorize other actions taken by Canada in pursuance of the resolutions made
by the Security Council. Moreover, since 1992, the United Nations Act1 26 and
Special Economic Measures Act 127 made it easier for Parliament to adopt and
enforce emergency 28 measures without being recalled. The determination of
whether or not an emergency exists is the responsibility of Parliament. The
troubling question here is whether these two legislative provisions have avoided
domestic parliamentary debate and Canadian public participation in military
activities.
In my view, even when such military measures have been authorized by the
Security Council, it would be desirable that the Canadian populace have a place
in the debates leading to the deployment of Canadian personnel to zones of
international conflict. These concerns arise because it is becoming increasingly
obvious that decisions of the Security Council on use of force may reflect narrow
geo-political-cum-economic interests of powerful veto-bearing members of the
Council rather than entrenched global interests or Canadian values. In other
words, aside from the undoubted legal powers of the Security Council to
authorize enforcement actions, Canada should play a progressive role on the
issue of global legitimate governance, particularly with respect to the Security
Council. 
29
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September
2001 and the emergence of new forms of threats to international peace and
security, the institutional and juridical capacity of the Security Council to
terminate wars, eliminate threats to peace, and institute a regime of global
governance has been seriously questioned. This situation is further complicated
by an increasingly uni-polar world determined to exploit multilateralism in
cynical ways. As multilateralism shrinks to a unilateralist display of economic
and military might, Canada is placed in the invidious position of adhering to the
letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter while taking extreme care to ensure that it
126 United Nations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. U-2.
127 Special Economic Measures Act, S.C. 1992, c. 17.
128 The Act defines emergency as "war, invasion, riot, or insurrection, real or apprehended."
129 For readings on the issue of global legitimate governance, see Inis Claude, "Collective
Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations" (1966) 20 Intal Organization
367; D.D. Caron, "Governance and Collective Legitimation in the New World Order" (1993)
6 Hague Y.B. Intal L. 29. See especially Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Amongst
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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does not jeopardize its enormous economic, cultural, and security ties with the
U.S.
E. Canada, Coalitions of the Willing and Global Legal Order
Perhaps no other international issue has exposed the Canadian quandary
about this matter than the current determination by the U.S. to assemble a
"coalition of the willing" against Iraq. In the circumstances, the seductions of
expediency may trump a principled rejection of any unilateralist non-defensive
action by any such coalition of the willing against Iraq. As indicated earlier, the
realpolitik of the Security Council is that the five permanent members of the
Council do not always act in the best interests of humanity. Sometimes, they are
propelled by national self-interest. In determining what role Canada should play
in the case of Iraq, it must be acknowledged that the Iraqi crisis is difficult but
not imponderable. Saddam Hussein, the "butcher of Baghdad" is a well-known
psychopath and a murderous thug. His pathological disdain for the rule of law
and his love for raw cruelty are well-known, and have been notorious since 1979.
However, the Canadian response to the Iraqi crisis should not lose sight of the
hypocrisy and double standards in its current revulsion over Hussein.1 30 These
pragmatic considerations ought to be fully ventilated in Parliament and in public
forums to enable Canadians to appreciate the nuances of the issues and to offer
informed input regarding Canada's role in any contemplated enforcement
actions.
First, those who today insist that there must be a "regime change" in Iraq and
vow that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction must be destroyed, were the same
institutions and persons who helped create and sustain the monstrosity which
Iraq has become.' 3 ' Hussein was encouraged and appeased by his current
130 Thomas Franck, "Of Gnats and Camels: Is there a Double Standard at the United Nations?"
(1984) 78 Am. J. Intal L. 811.
131 It is remarkable that twenty years ago, precisely on 20 December 1983, U.S. Secretary of
Defence Donald Rumsfeld was in Baghdad as an envoy of President Reagan. At that time,
Secretary Rumsfeld said he was happy to be in Baghdad and was delighted to convey
President Reagan's greetings to President Saddam Hussein. Again, at the material time, it
was known in intelligence and diplomatic circles that President Hussein was trying to build
nuclear weapons and acquire other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and
chemical weapons. The Israel government had already bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at
Osirak. Yet, the Reagan administration, fearing that the clerics of Tehran would overrun
Middle Eastern oilfields, supported or at least condoned Iraq's quest for illegal weapons. In
addition to providing generous supplies of arms, the United States knowingly permitted the
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that might be used to produce
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enemies while he murdered and destroyed and broke a series of international
norms on weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, but for his misadventure in
Kuwait, the Security Council members, especially the U.S., would have
continued to turn a blind eye to the egregious crimes of the Iraqi regime.'
These tragic incidents which summarize the cynicism, double standards, and
perhaps illegitimacy of the Security Council' 33 in relation to global politics and
economics compel Canada to be skeptical about assumptions that every dubious
claim to enforcement action ostensibly authorized by the Security Council or
promoted by an indignant "coalition of the willing" is ipsofacto a higher calling
to maintain global peace. As Professor Michael Reisman aptly pointed out,
international law is subjected to ridicule when ruthless and self-serving powerful
states embrace "the butchers of Tiananmen and the butcher of Hama so that the
United Nations can repel the butcher of Baghdad." '34 The litany of unprincipled,
cynical, and expedient exploitation of circumstances by powerful states requires
a critical appraisal of Canada's role in the global legal and security order. As
rightly pointed out by Professor Obiora Okafor, the greatest threat to global
stability and peace is not in "the failure to invade [Iraq] but in the hedonistic
conception of the function of law in the global systems."' 35
From the foregoing, it seems clear that although Canada is obliged to comply
with Security Council resolutions authorizing enforcement actions, it should also
strive to scrutinize the motives and intentions of the permanent members of the
Security Council lest it sheepishly follow the Council in lending credibility to an
illegitimate use of force. It is hardly debatable that the best way to ensure
legitimate participation in U.N. enforcement actions is to subject any decision
biological weapons. The United States turned a blind eye as Iraq's appetite for weapons of
mass destruction increased. Indeed, members of the United Nations Security Council kept
quiet while President Saddam Hussein gassed his own citizens and used chemical weapons
during the Iran-Iraq war.
132 The legitimacy of the Security Council is a matter of serious concern to many. See B.
Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision-Making: Precarious
Legitimacy" (1991) 85 Am. J. Intal L. 516.
133 But see R. Wolfrum, "The Security Council: Its Authority and Legitimacy" (1993) 87
A.S.I.L. Proceedings 316; D.D. Caron, "Strengthening the Collective Authority of the
Security Council" (1993) 87 A.S.I.L. Proceedings 303; Bardo Fassbender, "Quis Judicabit?
The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal Control" (2000) 11 E.J.I.L. 219.
134 W.M. Reisman, "Some Lessons From Iraq: International Law and Democratic Politics"
(1991) 16 Yale J. Intal L. 203 at 208.
13 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "The Global Process of Legitimation and the Legitimacy of Global
Governance" (1997) 14 Arizona J. Intal Comp. L. 250 at 115.
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to send Canadian troops to any international conflicts, particularly those thickly
enmeshed in power politics and the economic self-interests of members of the
Security Council, to rigorous parliamentary and public debate. Even where such
decisions have been debated in Parliament, Canada must constantly review and
assess the fairness and legitimacy of Security Council resolutions on the use of
force. Circumstances change and it would be naive to expect that U.N.
resolutions apparently authorizing the use of force in a particular set of
circumstances would remain just and legitimate under a changed set of
circumstances. If Canada is to promote the cause of legitimate global governance
and the termination of wars, 136 it must remain vigilant and cautious.
Canadian vigilance cannot be guaranteed unless Parliament is a potent and
vibrant institution for the articulation of public concerns and interests. In this
context, the chronic impotence of both the ruling party caucus and opposition
parties in Parliament give reason for concern. As Professor Wes Pue recently
pointed out, Canadian democracy is increasingly becoming dysfunctional. With
an electoral system designed to distort voter preferences, the development of de
facto one-party government, the ascendancy of the Prime Minister and massive
concentration of power in one person's control, and the decline of Parliament
and caucus, 137 an effective parliamentary role in the decision to engage in U.N.
enforcement actions is practically non-existent. A reappraisal of these
shortcomings in Canadian democracy would not only reinforce the rights of the
public through their elected representatives to have their input considered, but
would also afford a needed measure of legitimacy and responsiveness in how
and when Canada may engage in enforcement actions.
138
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that Canadian democratic practices as evidenced in
both pre-U.N. Charter and post-U.N. Charter regimes support the view that
Canada cannot lawfully participate in unilateral military actions outside the
scope of U.N. authorization. Canadian political-cum-legal custom seems to
suggest that Canada has hardly participated in an international conflict without
parliamentary debate, approval and/or ratification. In other words, Canadian
136 Brian Orend, "Terminating Wars and Establishing Global Governance" (1999) 12 Can. J.
L. & Jur. 253.
137 W. Wesley Pue, "Bad Government: There Are No Friendly Dictators, Even in Canada"
(2002) 10 Literary Rev. Can. 14.
138 Sheldon Alberts, "Let House Debate Role in Iraq War: Liberal MP's" National Post (15
January 2003) Al.
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participation in international conflicts, particularly those multilateral
interventions authorized by the Security Council, is often a function of
parliamentary approval. The question raised by this practice or convention is
whether it is a legal obligation on the part of the government. 39 The short answer
is that it is primarily a political obligation with implications for governmental
legitimacy.
These questions are significant because Parliament has a role in "approving
the process of placing military personnel on active service."' 4 More importantly,
Parliament has an undeniable role in reviewing the government's decision
concerning Canadian participation in the use of force in international relations.
Therefore, the question of Canadian participation cannot be a function of
executive discretion. The current case of Iraq gives cause for a sober reappraisal
of the need to re-institute public and parliamentary debate in the Canadian polity
before Canada participates in military actions or even continues to participate in
military actions at the instigation of powerful states with illegitimate or narrow
interests to serve. 141
Furthermore, I have argued that even in the face of Security Council
authorization, Canadian participation in use of force ought to be equally
grounded in domestic parliamentary justification. A fortiori, Canada may not
lawfully participate in "coalitions of the willing" where such coalitions operate
outside the prior authorization of the Security Council and are inconsistent with
informed public opinion. More importantly, in cases where a purported U.N.
authorization on collective enforcement is ambiguous and potentially liable to
be construed in such a way as to facilitate and encourage the use of force,
Canada ought to adopt an approach which construes international law as a
constraint on the use of force rather than a facilitator or catalyst for militaristic
responses. 42 Authorizing resolutions may be deliberately ambiguous because
they are often the product of compromises. The least expansive construction
should be placed on such authorizations if the Charter's presumptions against
resorting to armed conflicts are to be maintained. In a global legal and security
order gradually moving away from the norms of non-use of military force to the
evolution of new norms on the collective use of force, Canada is well placed to
139 Jim McNulty, "Liberals Owe Canadians Debate on Iraq" The Province (18 September 2002)
A14.
,40 Rossignol, supra note 76 at 15.
141 Pavel Felgenhauer, "Is Putin Ready to Bargain?" Moscow Times (12 September 2002) 9.
142 Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations
to Use Force, Cease-Fires and The Iraqi Inspection Regime" (1999) 93 Am. J. Intal L. 124.
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make significant contributions. An important component of this evolution is an
articulate and potent Parliament representing informed Canadians. In the absence
of any evidence that Iraq is about to attack a state, the battle-cry by the "coalition
of the willing" premised on a "first-strike" doctrine is a perversion of
international law which Canada must resist through proper multilateral channels.
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